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Behavioral/Systems/Cognitive

Functional Dissociation in Frontal and Striatal Areas for
Processing of Positive and Negative Reward Information
Xun Liu,1 David K. Powell,2 Hongbin Wang,3 Brian T. Gold,1 Christine R. Corbly,1 and Jane E. Joseph1
1

Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology and 2Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy Center, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
40536, and 3School of Health Information Sciences, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, Texas 77030

Reward-seeking behavior depends critically on processing of positive and negative information at various stages such as reward anticipation, outcome monitoring, and choice evaluation. Behavioral and neuropsychological evidence suggests that processing of positive
(e.g., gain) and negative (e.g., loss) reward information may be dissociable and individually disrupted. However, it remains uncertain
whether different stages of reward processing share certain neural circuitry in frontal and striatal areas, and whether distinct but
interactive systems in these areas are recruited for positive and negative reward processing. To explore these issues, we used a monetary
decision-making task to investigate the roles of frontal and striatal areas at all three stages of reward processing in the same event-related
functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Participants were instructed to choose whether to bet or bank a certain number of
chips. If they decided to bank or if they lost a bet, they started over betting one chip. If they won a bet, the wager was doubled in the next
round. Positive reward anticipation, winning outcome, and evaluation of right choices activated the striatum and medial/middle orbitofrontal cortex, whereas negative reward anticipation, losing outcome, and evaluation of wrong choices activated the lateral orbitofrontal
cortex, anterior insula, superior temporal pole, and dorsomedial frontal cortex. These findings suggest that the valence of reward
information and counterfactual comparison more strongly predict a functional dissociation in frontal and striatal areas than do various
stages of reward processing. These distinct but interactive systems may serve to guide human’s reward-seeking behavior.
Key words: event-related fMRI; reward; orbitofrontal cortex; striatum; anterior insula; dorsomedial frontal cortex

Introduction
Being able to adequately process reward information is essential
to our physical, mental, as well as socioeconomic well being (Fellows, 2004). Alterations in the reward system have been associated with various neuropsychiatric disorders, including depression (Drevets, 2001), pathological gambling (Goudriaan et al.,
2004), substance abuse (Volkow et al., 2003; Bechara, 2005; Garavan and Stout, 2005), eating disorders and obesity (Volkow and
Wise, 2005), and schizophrenia (Chau et al., 2004).
Recent neuroimaging studies on human reward circuitry have
implicated many brain regions, including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and striatum. These structures are the main projection
areas of two distinct dopaminergic pathways, the mesocortical
and mesolimbic pathways, respectively. Although it has been suggested that midbrain dopamine neurons play a major role in
reward processing (Schultz, 2002, 2006) in that they code prediction errors between actual and anticipated reward (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Montague and Berns, 2002; Montague et al., 2006), it
remains unclear how dopamine neurons modulate frontal and
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striatal areas at various stages of reward processing. For example,
potentially because of differences in experimental paradigms,
there have been mixed results as to whether the striatum and OFC
are responsible for reward anticipation or reward outcome (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001b; McClure et al., 2003; Ramnani et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004; Delgado
et al., 2005). Another issue is whether there are functionally distinct systems to process reward information of positive (e.g.,
gain) or negative (e.g., loss) valence (Kringelbach, 2005).
Whereas some studies suggest that medial areas (e.g., medial OFC
and striatum) are sensitive to relative gains (O’Doherty et al.,
2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005) and lateral areas (e.g., lateral OFC
and anterior insula) for loss or punishment (O’Doherty et al.,
2003a; Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003), other studies found
that activity of the caudate nucleus and insula was independent of
the valence of outcomes (Elliott et al., 2000; Delgado et al., 2003).
To a certain extent, these mixed results highlight some of the
important distinctions in human decision-making research, such
as expected values and utilities (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944; Knutson et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2006), framing and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Trepel et al., 2005), and cognitive-affective interaction (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Mellers, 2000; Ursu and Carter,
2005).
To better understand the functions of reward circuitry at different stages, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study used one experiment to examine three reward pro-
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Figure 1. Reward flowchart (top) and task procedures (bottom). Participants were informed
the result (win or lose) even if they decided to bank on a trial.

cesses, including reward anticipation, outcome monitoring, and
choice evaluation. In a computerized gambling task, participants
chose to bet or bank a certain number of chips and received
consequences (Fig. 1). With this interactive task, we were able to
examine brain activation patterns for positive and negative conditions at various phases of reward processing. We found a functional dissociation in frontal and striatal areas for processing of
positive and negative reward information and counterfactual
comparison. These distinct but interactive systems may serve to
guide human’s reward-seeking behavior.

Materials and Methods
Participants. Seventeen right-handed, native English speakers (age range,
18 – 45 years; average age of 26 ⫾ 8; nine women) were recruited from the
local community. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. We screened the participants for neurological, psychiatric, and
medical conditions through self-report. Potential volunteers were excluded if they reported taking any medications that affected CNS function (in consultation with a doctor associated with our protocol). None
of the participants in the present study reported taking such medications,
and none reported any major neurological, psychiatric, or medical conditions (including substance abuse and learning disabilities). We did not
ask questions with regard to menstrual cycle for female participants. A
signed informed consent form approved by University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board was obtained from each participant before the
experiment. Two male participants were excluded from data analysis
because of excessive head motion (absolute displacement with regard to
the reference scan exceeded half a voxel size, 1.75 mm).
Design and task. The task was a gambling game, in which participants
decided whether to bet or bank a certain number of chips at each trial. For
incentive, the final compensation for their participation included a bonus of $5.00 to $15.00 based on the total number of chips they earned at
the end of the experiment, in addition to the hourly payment.
The game proceeded as follows (Fig. 1 A). Each participant started off
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with 10 complimentary chips in the bank and used one as the first wager.
In each trial, the participant had to decide whether to bank or bet the
current wager. If she decided to bank, she would immediately earn the
current wager (i.e., the wager would be added to the bank). If she decided
to bet, the betting result would depend on a subsequent dice roll. If she
lost the bet, the wager was confiscated, and she needed to get another chip
out of her bank to continue the next trial. If she won the bet, the wager
would be doubled and she could continue with a doubled wager. When
the current wager reached 16 chips, the chips would be banked automatically and the game started over. As shown in Figure 1 A (the dotted
“look” line), one critical manipulation of the current experimental design was that even when she decided to bank, she would still witness the
following dice-throwing process and be informed of the outcome. Note
that this outcome is counterfactual in that it represents what would have
happened if she had chosen to bet. One of our major interests was to
investigate whether there are distinct brain activation patterns in factual
versus counterfactual conditions.
There were two levels of risk involved. For the low risk condition,
participants were informed the following: “The risk of the bet is relatively
low. If the dice is 1 or 2, you lose. Otherwise you win. Your chance of
winning against losing the bet is 2–1.” For the high-risk condition, they
were told the following: “The risk of the bet is relatively high. If the dice is
1, 2, or 3, you lose. Otherwise you win. Your chance of winning against
losing the bet is 1–1.” The outcome sequence of the trials (winning or
losing) was predetermined by the computer in a random manner but
constrained by the risk level. To make the dice roll result more salient, the
border of the dice was depicted as green if it was a “win” trial or red if it
was a “lose” trial. To ensure that participants understood the procedures,
they were trained for 10 trials of each risk level before they performed the
task in the scanner.
Procedures. An event-related design was implemented. A trial consisted of four different events in a fixed order: a chip number event
indicating the current wager (i.e., the chips at stake), a responsecollecting event asking participants to bank or bet the chips, an outcome
event indicating a winning or losing dice roll regardless of the participant’s choice to bet or bank, and a blank event with a central fixation (Fig.
1 B). Each event within a trial lasted 2 s, except for the blank event, which
was displayed for either 2, 4, or 6 s randomly. The first four scans (8 s) of
each run were used as a buffer. The remainder of each run consisted of a
total of 42 trials. Four runs were acquired for each participant, two for the
high-risk condition and two for the low-risk condition. The order of the
risk conditions was counter-balanced across the four runs within each
participant as well as across participants.
One potential issue with such a fixed order of events was that neuronal
responses evoked by different components within a trial might become
highly correlated and hard to be differentially estimated. We considered
as an alternative, a jittered design (i.e., jittering every event within a trial),
which would significantly increase the trial length and the length of the
session. However, this could compromise data quality by introducing
more motion artifact resulting from longer scanning sessions. Another
alternative was to have a jittered design but reduce the number of trials,
keeping the session length the same as in the present design. However,
reducing the number of trials would reduce detection power caused by
reduced repetition of experimental conditions. For these reasons, we
chose the present design, but we address the concern of potential correlations among events in the fMRI data analysis and behavioral results
below.
Data acquisition. A 3T Siemens (Erlangen, Germany) Trio magnetic
resonance imaging system located at the University of Kentucky Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy Center equipped for echoplanar imaging (EPI) was used for data acquisition. EPI images were
acquired with an eight-channel head coil using the blood oxygen leveldependent (BOLD) technique (repetition time, 2000 ms; echo time, 29
ms; flip angle, 76°), each consisting of 34 contiguous axial slices (matrix,
64 ⫻ 64; in-plane resolution, 3.5 ⫻ 3.5 mm 2; thickness, 3.5 mm; no gap),
parallel to the inside curve of each participant’s OFC to reduce the signal
loss and distortion in this region (Deichmann et al., 2003). A highresolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo
(MP-RAGE) anatomical set (192 sagittal slices of full head; matrix, 224 ⫻
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The normalization procedure involved registering the average EPI image to the MP-RAGE
image from the same participant and then to
the ICBM152 T1 template, using the FLIRT
(FMRIB Linear Image Registration Tool)
module.
To identify the regions of brain activation, we
defined the regions of interest (ROIs) by clusters of 30 or more contiguous voxels (Xiong et
al., 1995) in which there was significant difference in brain activity across conditions (Z ⬎
2.81; p ⬍ 0.005, two-tailed). Using the Mintun
peak algorithm (Mintun et al., 1989), we further located the local peaks (maximal activation) within each ROI. Additional ROI analyses
were performed using the average signals extracted from these clusters.

Results
Behavioral results
We present the descriptive statistics according to different reward processes (e.g.,
Figure 2. Behavioral results. The figures show the frequency of bank versus bet (A), conditional probability of bank and bet frequency and proportion of positive verbased on the outcome of previous trial (B, C), frequency of right and wrong choices (D, E), and number of chips earned for each run sus negative reward anticipation and
(F ). There were 84 trials across two runs for each risk level.
choice evaluation). Because the frequencies of reward outcomes (e.g., win vs loss)
were predefined, we report the net earning
2
256; field of view, 224 ⫻ 256 mm ; slice thickness, 1 mm; no gap) was
of chips for each run instead.
collected for each participant.
Stimuli were presented using a high-resolution rear projection system
with responses recorded via two fiber-optics response pads, each with
one button. A computer running E-Prime controlled stimulus presentation and recording of responses. In addition, the timing of the stimulus
presentation was synchronized with magnet trigger pulses.
Image analysis. Before statistical analysis, the first four volumes of each
run were discarded to allow the MR signal to reach steady state. The
remaining images in each participant’s time series were motion corrected
using the MCFLIRT module of FSL (FMRIB Software Library, version
3.2) package (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Images in the data series
were then spatially smoothed with a three-dimensional Gaussian kernel
(full-width half-maximum, 7 ⫻ 7 ⫻ 7 mm 3) and temporally filtered
using a high-pass filter (90 s). The FEAT (FMRIB Expert Analysis Tool)
module of FSL package was used for these steps and later statistical
analysis.
Customized square waveforms were generated for each individual.
These waveforms were convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic
response function (HRF). For each participant, we used FILM (FMRIB
Improved Linear Model), with local autocorrelation correction, to estimate the hemodynamic parameters for four explanatory variables (the
number of chips, bank or bet, loss or win, and wrong or right) and
generate statistical contrast maps of interest. Given the concern about the
fixed order of events within a trial, we expected that the right/wrong
regressor would be correlated with the other two regressors given this
variable was determined by the combination of the other two variables
(bet-win and bank-loss constituted the right choices, whereas bet-loss
and bank-win constituted the wrong choices). However, we expected
that the bet/bank regressor would not highly correlate with the win/loss
regressor because of randomness and unpredictability of the outcomes.
Considering the nature of these regressors, we constructed a general
linear model, orthogonizing the right/wrong regressor with regard to the
win/loss regressor, basically similar to a partial correlation analysis to
partial out the brain activation patterns uniquely explained by each regressor. It should be noted that a significant correlation between these
regressors limits the sensitivity to discriminate between different phases.
Each of the four runs for each participant was analyzed separately, and
the average of these four runs for each individual was obtained through a
higher level analysis using the FLAME (FMRIB Local Analysis of Mixed
Effects) module (stage 1 only). Contrast maps were warped into common
stereotaxic space before mixed-effects group analyses were performed.

Reward anticipation and decision making: bet (positive)
versus bank (negative)
The ideal ratio of bet versus bank should be 1:1 for the high-risk
condition and 2:1 for the low-risk condition based on the predefined ratios of win versus loss in these conditions. However,
there was a strong tendency for participants to bet the chips,
 2(1) ⫽ 17.922, p ⬍ 10 ⫺4 (against no bias) (Fig. 2 A). The ratio of
bet versus bank was 2.72 overall. This bias to bet was stronger for
the low-risk condition than for the high-risk condition, as indicated by a significant interaction between the choices (bet vs
bank) and the levels of risk (high vs low),  2(1) ⫽ 37.578, p ⬍
10 ⫺9 (against no bias across the levels of risk). For the low-risk
condition, the ratio of bet versus bank was 3.58,  2(1) ⫽ 5.006,
p ⫽ 0.025 (against the ideal ratio of 2:1); and for the high-risk
condition, the ratio was 2.13,  2(1) ⫽ 10.906, p ⫽ 0.001 (against
the ideal ratio of 1:1). Furthermore, within a risk condition, there
was a significant interaction between the choice (bet vs bank) and
the outcome of the previous trial (win vs loss). Specifically, for the
high-risk condition, participants were equally likely to bet or
bank after a win under the win–loss ratio of 1:1 (bet– bank ratio of
0.97,  2(1) ⫽ 0.009, p ⫽ 0.925) but were more likely to bet after
a loss (bet– bank ratio of 5.97 against the ideal ratio of 1:1,
 2(1) ⫽ 20.769, p ⬍ 10 ⫺5),  2(1) ⫽ 20.778, p ⬍ 10 ⫺5 (Fig. 2 B).
For the low-risk condition, participants were twice as likely to bet
than bank after a win under the win–loss ratio of 2:1 (bet– bank
ratio of 2.25,  2(1) ⫽ 0.156, p ⫽ 0.693) but were biased to bet
after a loss (bet– bank ratio of 17.59 against the ideal ratio of 2:1,
 2(1) ⫽ 9.588, p ⫽ 0.002),  2(1) ⫽ 9.744, p ⫽ 0.002 (Fig. 2C).
These findings indicated that participants tended to be risktaking to maximize monetary gain, particularly when they were
losing. Relatively lower risk level further promoted such riskseeking behavior.
Choice evaluation: right (positive) versus wrong (negative)
When participants bet and won or when they banked and avoided
a potential loss, the choices were “right” and these conditions
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represented positive choice evaluation. Table 1. Brain areas activated during the stage of reward anticipation and decision making
When they bet but lost or when they Label
BA
Cluster size
x
y
z
Max Z
banked but could have won if they had deBet ⬎ bank
cided to bet, the choices were “wrong” and
Med. OFC
11
297
⫺4
38
⫺12
3.53
these conditions represented negative
25
87
6
16
⫺8
3.46
choice evaluation. As seen in Figure 2 D,
Sup. frontal
6
36
⫺26
⫺2
68
3.09
participants made approximately equal
Caudate nucleus
25
93
⫺14
20
8
3.32
number of right or wrong choices during
25
39
8
18
6
3.36
the high-risk condition,  2(1) ⫽ 1.190, Bank ⬎ bet
Inf. frontal
38
984
56
20
0
4.61
p ⫽ 0.275, and relatively more right
Lat. OFC
47
2492
⫺48
34
⫺6
4.79
choices during the low-risk condition,
10
114
⫺40
60
⫺2
3.61
 2(1) ⫽ 5.902, p ⫽ 0.015. In fact, they
Sup. frontal
10
85
20
62
18
3.37
made right choices approximately two
6
33
32
⫺8
66
3.45
times as frequently as wrong ones, which
Dorsomedial frontal
8
801
12
28
54
4.10
was about the same as the win–loss ratio of
Insula
48
54
⫺40
⫺4
8
3.61
2
2:1 for the low-risk condition,  (1) ⫽
Insula/thalamus
48
558
34
⫺18
4
4.49
0.440, p ⫽ 0.507. Further breakdown of BA, Brodmann area; Inf., inferior; Lat., lateral; Med., medial; Sup., superior; Max, maximum.
right and wrong choices is shown in Figure
2 E. These patterns suggested that particimaking, reward delivery and outcome monitoring, and choice
pants implicitly adopted the ideal strategy, which was prescribed
evaluation). Although we also manipulated the levels of risk in
by the predefined ratios of win versus loss, although they were
the study, this factor interacted with different reward processes to
biased toward risk-taking after a loss.
a minimal degree. This was possibly a result of separation of risk
Number of chips earned
Figure 2 F shows the total number of chips earned for each of the
high- and low-risk runs. Participants broke even during the highrisk condition and gained chips during the low-risk condition.
Repeated-measures ANOVA with the risk levels and runs
(within-subject) and orders of the risk levels (between-subject)
revealed that the number of chips gained was significantly affected by the risk levels [F(1,13) ⫽ 86.886, mean squared error
(MSE) ⫽ 28.550, p ⫽ 0.000), the runs (F(1,13) ⫽ 9.6859, MSE ⫽
17.704, p ⫽ 0.008), and marginally by the orders of the risk levels
(F(1,13) ⫽ 4.061, MSE ⫽ 67.401, p ⫽ 0.065). This further confirmed that participants performed within the reasonable range,
such that they did not gain or lose when the risk was at the chance
level and profited when the odds were favorable.
Correlation between decision, outcome, and evaluation
There were moderate correlations among the variables for different stages of reward processing. As expected, correlations between decision (bet vs bank) and outcome (win vs loss) were
moderate, given that of 60 total correlation analyses (i.e., 15 subjects ⫻ 4 runs/subject) between the bet/bank and win/loss variables, only nine were significant. However, correlations between
the win/loss and right/wrong variables were significant in 48 of 60
cases. After convolving with the HRF, correlations among these
regressors became slightly higher, with 17 of 60 significant for the
bet/bank and win/loss regressors and 54 of 60 for the win/loss and
right/wrong regressors. It should be noted that most of the significant correlations between bet/bank and win/loss regressors
were negative, suggesting that it was not caused by the positive
correlation between bet/bank (1/⫺1) and win/loss (1/⫺1) within
a trial, but by the negative correlation between consecutive trials.
As shown in Figure 2, B and C, the choice of the current trial was
affected by the outcome of the preceding trial. Specifically, participants were more likely to bet after a loss than a win. As a
consequence, jittering the intertrial interval helped alleviate the
correlation between the bet/bank and win/loss regressors.
Imaging results
We report the imaging data related to three stages of reward
processing separately (i.e., reward anticipation and decision

levels into different runs, which reduced the statistical power of
detecting the difference caused by the risk levels. Nevertheless,
several frontal regions, including the superior, middle frontal
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor
areas, as well as the inferior and superior parietal cortex were
differentially activated by the high- and low-risk conditions. The
areas modulated by the risk levels are listed in supplemental Table
1 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Given that the two risk levels produced otherwise similar
brain activation patterns, the following analyses were based on
pooled data of both high- and low-risk conditions. The focus of
the results and discussion will be limited to the frontal cortex and
striatum, although there are interesting patterns of activation
observed in the posterior visual processing areas as well (supplemental Table 2, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material).
Areas sensitive to reward anticipation and decision making
(bet vs bank)
The contrast between bet and bank choices illustrated expectation of winning (positive anticipation) versus losing (negative
anticipation). Presumably, participants would take the risk and
bet if they thought they were likely to win. In contrast, they would
bank the wager to avoid a loss if they expected the outcome was
against them. As shown in Table 1, the caudate nucleus and medial OFC were significantly more active when participants made
the bet than when they banked (Fig. 3A). In contrast, the lateral
OFC, inferior frontal, and superior medial frontal cortex as well
as the anterior insula showed greater activation when participants banked the chips in anticipation of losing the trial, compared with when they chose to bet in anticipation of winning (Fig.
3B).
According to many decision theories, the choice made at the
bet/bank decision stage may result from a combination of different factors such as the probability assessment and risk tolerance,
framing of the context, and expected values (objective) and utility
(subjective) of different outcomes. We do not subscribe to any
particular one. Instead, we use “reward anticipation” to summarize the net effect of all of these factors. Choosing a risky bet and
foregoing the sure gain of banking reflects a win of the positive
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Figure 3. Imaging results. A, C, and E show the striatum (top) and medial/middle OFC (bottom), and B, D, and F show the
lateral OFC and anterior insula/superior temporal pole (top) and dorsomedial frontal cortex (bottom). The right side of the image
is right side of the brain.
Table 2. Brain areas activated during the stage of reward delivery and outcome monitoring
Label
Win ⬎ loss
Inf. frontal
Mid. OFC
Sup. frontal
Caudate nucleus
Putamen
Post./sup. insula
Loss ⬎ win
Inf. frontal
Dorsomedial frontal
Ant. insula/sup. temporal pole
Midbrain

BA

Cluster size

x

y

48
11
9
6
25
48
48
48

125
1491
196
151
195
82
72
67

34
⫺20
⫺24
⫺16
18
⫺20
⫺36
36

30
34
32
6
16
8
⫺18
⫺18

45
44
10
38
38

160
35
485
1116
840
1035

52
⫺60
2
42
⫺40
0

34
20
54
14
16
⫺30

BA, Brodmann area; Inf., inferior; Sup., superior; Ant., anterior; Mid., middle; Post., posterior; Max, maximum.

reward anticipation over the negative fear of loss. According to
calculation of expected values, it was unlikely that participants
made their decisions based on the expected values of the two
choices. The design of the task was such that the winning payoff
was doubled whenever participants bet and won. Therefore, in
the case of the high-risk condition where the odds were 1:1 for

win versus loss (50% to win), the expected
values for both decisions (bank and bet)
were the same on each specific trial. For
example, when the chip count was 1, betting the chip had the expected value of 1
(⫽ 2 ⫻ 50% ⫹ 0 ⫻ 50%), whereas banking
the chip also had the expected value of 1
(⫽ 1 ⫻ 100%). If participants won the first
trial and had two chips to wager, the expected values of both “bet” and “bank” decision were still matched for bet (4 ⫻
50% ⫹ 0 ⫻ 50%) and bank (2 ⫻ 100%).
Therefore, the decision to “bet” or “bank”
could not be solely based on choosing the
option associated with a larger expected
value but rely on the outlook of the reward
outcome. In the case of the low-risk condition where the odds are 2:1 for win versus loss (67% to win), the expected value
for the “bet” decision (2 ⫻ 67% ⫹ 0 ⫻
33%) was always higher than that of the
“bank” decision (1 ⫻ 100%). This payoff
scheme could not explain why participants
chose to bank in some trials if they made
their decisions solely based on expected
values. Therefore the logic behind the decision was likely to be driven by anticipation of the outcome, instead of the choice
between two alternative expected values.
However, we could not rule out that their
decisions to bank or bet may also be influenced by other factors such as expected utilities of two alternatives, participants’ framing and assessment of the risk involved in a
specific trial, their perceived randomness of
the outcome (e.g., they may underestimate
the risk after a loss trial), etc.

Areas sensitive to reward delivery and
outcome monitoring (win vs loss)
The contrast between win and loss trials il26
3.57
lustrated positive and negative outcome
⫺16
4.01
monitoring. As shown in Table 2, the cau36
3.58
date nucleus, middle OFC, and left middle
52
3.82
frontal cortex as well as the superior/poste4
4.38
rior insula became more active when partic⫺4
3.59
ipants won than when they lost (Fig. 3C). In
8
4.16
contrast, the inferior frontal and superior
12
3.47
medial frontal cortex, anterior insula, supe12
4.07
rior temporal pole, and midbrain were sig20
3.69
nificantly activated when the outcome was
30
3.54
against the participants (Fig. 3D). It is nota⫺18
4.94
ble that there is a mediolateral distinction in
⫺14
5.13
the ventrofrontal cortex between positive
2
4.85
and negative outcome monitoring, similar
to the one observed during positive versus
negative reward anticipation.
We did not, however, observe amygdala and surrounding areas activated for processing of negative reward information,
which was found in previous studies (Breiter et al., 2001;
O’Doherty et al., 2003a). We speculate that the emotional response elicited by the negative consequences (i.e., losing chips)
was not strong enough to activate the amygdala, given that all but
z

Max Z
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one participant never had a cumulative
chip count lower than zero. Nevertheless,
according to one of the principles of the
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), the outcome of a gamble is framed
as a gain or loss with respect to a neutral
point instead of the cumulative asset.
Therefore, it is legitimate to compare winning versus losing of each trial to examine
reward process involved in monitoring
positive or negative outcomes. It should be
noted, however, that because of the absence of strong aversive consequences
(punishment), the mediolateral distinction observed above may only be present
within the intensity range of the outcomes
tested in this study. Given the lack of this
distinction observed in the literature using
strong negative reinforcers (e.g., pain), additional research is needed to assess how
broadly such a distinction may apply to
strong rewarding or aversive stimuli.

Table 3. Brain areas activated during the stage of choice evaluation
Label
Right ⬎ wrong
Mid. frontal
Mid. OFC
Sup. OFC

Striatum
Wrong ⬎ right
ACC
Subgenual ACC
Inf. frontal
Ant. med. OFC
Ant. insula/sup. temporal pole

BA

Cluster size

x

y

z

Max Z

46
47
46
11
11
11
25
25

64
256
40
264
78
56
1149
938

40
⫺34
42
22
⫺18
24
14
⫺20

34
56
56
42
44
56
18
⫺4

24
⫺12
⫺8
⫺14
⫺18
⫺2
⫺2
22

3.14
3.85
3.42
3.97
3.56
3.27
5.15
4.65

32
24
11
45
11
38
38

235
50
34
65
73
495
493

6
4
⫺2
54
0
54
⫺36

52
20
26
26
56
14
10

24
24
⫺10
8
⫺8
⫺14
⫺22

3.92
3.29
3.38
3.30
3.37
3.99
3.93

BA, Brodmann area; Inf., inferior; med., medial; sup., superior; Ant., anterior; Mid., middle; Max, maximum.

Areas sensitive to evaluation of choices
(right vs wrong)
Evaluation of choices can also be distinguished by the feedback provided to the
participants. Specifically, when the outcome of reward matched reward expectation (“right” decision), the choice was positively evaluated (e.g., rejoicing and glad).
This included both banking-and-lost and
betting-and-won. In contrast, when the
outcome did not match expectations
(“wrong” decision), the choice was negatively evaluated (e.g., regretting and sad).
This included both banking-and-won and
betting-and-lost. As shown in Table 3,
positive choice evaluation significantly activated the striatum, middle and superior
OFC, as well as the middle frontal cortex
compared with negative choice evaluation
(Fig. 3E). In contrast, the inferior frontal
and dorsomedial frontal cortex, including
the ACC, superior temporal pole, and anterior insula, became more active when
participants negatively evaluated their decision compared with when they made the
right choice (Fig. 3F ).
Similar and unique regions for different
reward processing stages and distinct
Figure 4. Conjunctive overlay of positive (A) and negative (B) aspects of reward processing and detailed coronal slices of
areas for positive and negative valences
overlapping regions of positive reward processing in the striatum (C) and negative reward processing in the lateral OFC and
of these processes
As illustrated in a conjunctive overlay in anterior insula (D).
Figure 4 A, the positive aspect of each of
as the dorsomedial frontal cortex (Fig. 4C). Figure 4 D displays
the three reward processes recruited similar regions along the
the details of overlapping activation in the left and right OFC and
medial aspects of the brain, including the caudate nucleus, and
anterior insula regions.
medial/middle OFC. Figure 4 B displays the details of overlapping
We also performed direct contrasts between different phases
activation in the left and right striatum. In contrast, the negative
to determine brain regions uniquely activated in a specific phase
aspect of each of the three processes demonstrated similar neural
more than the others (supplemental Table 3, available at www.
profiles in the ventrolateral areas, such as the lateral OFC, inferior
jneurosci.org as supplemental material). In examining brain acfrontal cortex, anterior insula, and superior temporal pole, as well
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Figure 5. Regional BOLD response of the conjunctive ROIs in the left and right striatum
(positive processes ⬎ negative processes) and left and right OFC and anterior insula (negative
processes ⬎ positive processes).

tivation patterns resulting from these direct contrasts, we noted,
however, that these patterns may not be specific to a certain reward process per se. For example, the decision stage (bet/bank)
involved a motor response and simple visual input, whereas the
outcome stage (win/loss) involved complex visual input but no
motor response. The direct contrast revealed that the decision
stage activated the motor cortex to a higher degree, whereas the
outcome stage significantly recruited the visual cortex. However,
these activation patterns were not specific to reward processing.
Also, because the processes involved in different stages were not
controlled, direct contrasts between these phases could not pinpoint specific reward-related functions.
Region of interest analysis of the striatal and lateral
OFC/insula areas
Through conjunctive masking, we identified two medial striatal
areas (Fig. 4 B) and two lateral OFC/insula areas (Fig. 4 D) commonly activated by the valence contrast (positive vs negative)
across various stages. ANOVA analyses were performed on average signal intensity extracted from these ROIs (Fig. 5). We confirmed that there were significant valence effects across these
ROIs. Additionally, we found that although the valence effects
did not differ across different phases (no significant valence by
stages interaction), the main effect of reward phases indicated
that these three stages engaged these ROIs differentially. Activation patterns were similar between the decision and outcome
phases, whereas the profile for the evaluation phase presented a
slightly different pattern.
To illustrate common and distinct involvement of these medial (left and right striatum) and lateral (lateral OFC/anterior
insula) ROIs in different aspects of reward processing, we plotted
their respective time courses for different conditions. As shown in
Figure 6, positive anticipation of reward (bet) activated the bilateral striatum more than negative anticipation (bank), at 4 – 6 s
after the choices were made. In parallel, positive outcome (win)
also activated these areas to a higher degree than negative outcome (loss), at 8 –10 s after the outcomes were revealed. Similar
time courses of the striatum for choice evaluation were also observed. Positive evaluation of right choices significantly activated
the striatum, compared with negative evaluation of wrong
choices, at 4 –10 s after the consequence of the choice became
clear. In contrast, the lateral OFC and anterior insula regions
displayed greater activation for negative anticipation, outcome,
and choice evaluation (Fig. 6).
Another interesting finding from this analysis concerns differ-
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ent neural substrates for factual and counterfactual reward processes. Counterfactual reasoning, often in the form of “if only I
had acted differently,” is an important type of reasoning underlying human causal inference. In the current context, counterfactual thinking manifested itself most clearly when we compared
the two banking conditions, in which the actual gain was not
affected by the outcomes. However, having participants witness
the outcome even after they banked prompted them to realize
that “this would have happened if only I had bet.” An added value
of examining counterfactual comparison in the reward task is
that it helps disentangle the effects of attention and rewardrelated processes on the neurophysiological measures (e.g., fMRI
signals) as mentioned by Maunsell (2004). Because counterfactual comparison reflects the interaction between different stages
of reward processing such that reward expectancy modifies the
experience of an outcome, it helps rule out the possibility that the
signals observed in these reward-related processes are potentially
caused by an alteration of attention allocation.
To investigate counterfactual comparison, we examined
choice evaluation more closely by breaking down the right and
wrong choices into four different conditions and plotting the
time courses of the conjunctive ROIs for these conditions (Fig. 7).
Activity in the striatum was determined by the combination of
decision and outcome for making the right choice. Both the betwin and bank-loss conditions (correct choices to maximize gain
and prevent loss) activated bilateral striatum significantly higher
than the two incorrect choices (i.e., suffer a loss for the bet-loss
condition and fail to profit for bank-win condition). Although
the actual gain was not affected by the outcomes after a banking
choice, participants devaluated their banking choice when they
would have won and doubled their chips had they decided to bet.
The striatal response for this bank-win condition was even lower,
in rank, than the bet-loss condition when participants suffered an
actual loss (Fig. 7 A, B).
In contrast, a different counterfactual comparison pattern was
observed in the lateral OFC and anterior insula. These regions
were significantly activated by both counterfactual regret in the
bank-win scenario and counterfactual relief in the bank-loss scenario (Fig. 7C,D). For example, one comparison was between
bet-loss and bank-win conditions, both of which were “wrong”
and led to a negative feeling of regret. However, the regret in the
former case was indicative (“I bet but I lost”), whereas the regret
in the latter case was counterfactual (“I would have won had I
bet”). A similar comparison was between bet-win and bank-loss.
Both scenarios were “right” and led to a positive feeling of relief.
Again, the former was indicative (“I bet and won”), whereas the
latter was counterfactual (“I would have lost had I bet”). Alternatively, this pattern of activity in the OFC and anterior insula may
simply be driven by the decision to bank. However, the responses
of the OFC and anterior insula in Figure 7, C and D, were quite
different from those shown in Figure 6 in two aspects. First, the
time courses were time locked to the onsets of the events. The
responses peaked at 4 – 6 s after a decision was made, whereas they
peaked at 4 – 8 s after the consequence of the decision became
evident, which itself was at least 2 s after a decision was made.
Second, the differences in decision (bet vs bank) were driven by
more negative activation for the “bet” choice, whereas the differences in evaluation (factual vs counterfactual) were driven by
more positive activation for the counterfactual comparison.

Discussion
A range of decision theories, including classical expected utility
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), prospect theory
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982;
Mellers, 2000), could each offer great insights about why people behaved the way
they behaved in this gambling task. For instance, whereas the expected value of
banking was equal to that of betting in the
high-risk condition (both equal to the
number of chips at stake), by preferring
betting to banking people were presumably maximizing expected utility. However, it is important to recognize that no
single factor is able to explain the full range
of results reported here. It seems clear that
the adopted strategy depends on multiple
factors, including the participant’s attitude toward risk, framing of the outcome,
emotional response, and even the context
(e.g., reward history). By contrasting different conditions (bank/bet, win/loss,
right/wrong, factual/counterfactual), the
current study allows us to examine the
possible functional distinction in frontal
and striatal areas for reward processing
across different stages.
One distinction has to do with the relationship between reward anticipation and
reward delivery. Some neuroimaging
studies have suggested that different brain
regions are involved in reward expectation
and reward delivery (Knutson et al.,
2001b). They found that the nucleus accumbens was significantly activated when
participants were anticipating reward
(Knutson et al., 2001a), whereas the mesial
prefrontal cortex was preferentially recruited during reward delivery (Knutson
et al., 2003). However, results from other
studies question such a distinction. Rogers
et al. (2004) found that positive outcomes
activated both the striatum and medial
OFC more than negative outcomes at the Figure 6. Time course plots of the conjunctive ROIs for various stages of reward processing of positive (solid lines) and negative
(dashed lines) information. The left and right striatum show greater responses to the positive aspects of reward processing,
phase of reward delivery. Delgado et al. whereas the left and right OFC and anterior insula areas show greater responses to the negative aspects of reward processing.
(2005) reported that both anticipation and
outcome stages of reward recruited the
regions attenuated and even dropped below the baseline. Deacticaudate nucleus. Moreover, Breiter et al. (2001) found that both
vation of these regions for negative prediction errors has been
nucleus accumbens and OFC were similarly activated during
documented in previous studies (Knutson et al., 2001b; McClure
both phases of reward anticipation and delivery of reward.
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003b). These findings suggest that
Single-cell recording studies in animals have also shown that
both medial/middle OFC and striatum are commonly recruited
neurons in both OFC and striatum increased firing during both
in reward expectation, outcome monitoring, and choice evaluaexpectation and delivery of reward [Schultz et al. (2000), their
tion. This idea is in accordance with the concept of cognitiveFig. 9], under phasic modulation of midbrain dopamine neurons
affective interaction in choice behavior (Mellers, 2000). Choices
(Schultz, 1998). Such an animal model has been supported by
are made based on expected utilities. Comparison between the
neuroimaging studies in humans as well (Braver and Brown,
obtained and alternative outcomes affects the anticipated feelings
2003). The striatum (Pagnoni et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003)
of obtaining a certain outcome (e.g., regret or relief). These anand OFC (O’Doherty et al., 2003b) are the primary brain regions
ticipated feelings, in turn, modify the utility function. Therefore,
targeted by such dopaminergic modulation in reward processing.
it is reasonable for these different reward processes to share cerConsistent with this neuroimaging and neurophysiological
tain neural circuitry.
evidence, we found that both reward expectation and reward
A second distinction is related to processing of positive versus
delivery recruited similar brain regions in the medial/middle
negative reward information. The current results corroborated
OFC and striatum when the outlook of reward processing was
the mediolateral distinction within the OFC for positive and negpositive. In addition, when outcome did not match expectation,
ative reward processing (O’Doherty et al., 2001) [see a meta analwhich resulted in a negative prediction error, activity in these
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their decision-making strategy. Otherwise,
they negatively evaluate their choice and
adjust their future responses. In the
present study, we found that positive evaluation of right choices activated similar
brain areas as other positive reward processes, such as the middle OFC and striatum. In contrast, negative evaluation of
wrong choices significantly recruited the
bilateral superior temporal pole extending
to the anterior insula. The role of anterior
insula in negative emotions such as regret
(Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) and disgust
(Sanfey et al., 2003) in reward behavior
may affect peoples’ decision strategy and
lead them to adjust their future choice
behavior.
Counterfactual comparison also plays a
critical role in choice evaluation and activity of the reward circuitry. This process involves comparison of the obtained outcome and the outcome of an alternative
choice. When the alternative yields a better
Figure 7. A–D, Time course plots for the breakdown of the right and wrong choices. Activity in the striatum was sensitive to outcome than the executed choice does,
the combination of decision and outcome for making the right choice (solid lines). Although the actual gain was not affected by people usually experience negative emothe outcome after a banking choice, the reduced striatal activity for the bank-win scenario clearly demonstrated counterfactual tion such as regret and reevaluate utilities
comparison. Participants devaluated the gain when they could have doubled their chips had they bet. Activity in the lateral OFC associated with different options. For exand anterior insula was driven by counterfactual reasoning after a banking choice (square markers). “What if I had bet” produced ample, the “what if” scenario resulted from
counterfactual regret (bank-win, “I could have doubled the chips”) or relief (bank-loss, “I could have lost”), compared with the the bank-win condition caused particifactual regret (bet-loss, “I lost”) or relief (bet-win, “I won”).
pants devaluate their banking decision, because they would have profited more from
ysis by Kringelbach and Rolls (2004)]. When participants exthe alternative choice. Although the actual gain did not depend
pected to win, actually won the chips, and positively evaluated
on the outcome after the banking decision, the striatum showed
their choices, the medial/middle areas of the OFC became more
significant deactivation for the bank-win condition, compared
active, compared with when the outlook of reward processing
with the bank-loss condition. This result confirms a similar findwas negative. The striatum showed similar activation patterns as
ing (Breiter et al., 2001), in which activity in the nucleus accumthe medial OFC. In contrast, the lateral areas, including the lateral
bens was sensitive to counterfactual comparison. In contrast, acOFC, anterior insula, and superior temporal pole, were signifitivity in the lateral OFC and anterior insula was driven by both
cantly activated for negative reward processes during anticipacounterfactual regret in the bank-win scenario and counterfaction, outcome, and choice evaluation. Previous studies have
tual relief in the bank-loss scenario (Fig. 7C,D). The counterfacshown that the anterior insula is involved in negative emotion
tual conditions showed higher activation than the corresponding
and reward-related processing (for review, see Phan et al., 2002),
factual conditions, indicating that bilateral OFC and anterior ingiven its close reciprocal connection with the amygdala. Critchley
sula were closely related to counterfactual reward processing.
et al. (2001), using a card-guessing reward task, found that activThis result is consistent with another fMRI study on counterfacity of the anterior insula and lateral OFC positively correlated
tual comparison (Ursu and Carter, 2005).
with the risk involved. Paulus et al. (2003) reported that activity
Positive and negative evaluation of choices may have different
of the insula became stronger when participants selected a more
effects in guiding future decision-making behavior. Present berisky choice versus a safer one. The right insula was also signifihavioral results suggested that participants adopted different
cantly activated by the punishing trials. Kuhnen and Knutson
strategies based on the outcomes from the previous trials. When
(2005) found that relative loss between the chosen and unchosen
they won, the likelihood of choosing to bet versus bank implicitly
stocks activated the anterior insula. However, it should be noted
followed the “ideal” ratios of win versus loss. However, after a
that studies using physiological stimuli (e.g., taste) suggest that
loss, they completely abandoned this strategy and became more
activity in both the insula and ventral striatum may be driven by
likely to bet. This win-stay-lose-switch strategy is often observed
the stimulus intensity as well as the valence of stimuli (Small et al.,
in reinforcement learning in both animals and humans. The me2003) or subjective preference (O’Doherty et al., 2006).
diolateral distinction we observed suggests the roles of the medial
Another distinction is related to choice evaluation in reward
areas in maintaining response strategy and the lateral areas in
processing. Emotional responses associated with choice assessadjusting choice behavior (Cools et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al.,
ment may exert a significant influence on future reward behavior.
2003a).
Usually choice evaluation involves determining whether the anThe dorsomedial frontal activation observed for negative reticipated reward is realized or not (i.e., prediction error) as well as
ward processes in the current study also supports the role of the
whether the alternative is better or worse (i.e., counterfactual
ACC in response switching (Bush et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al.,
comparison). When there is no negative prediction error, people
2003a). Event-related potential studies on error-related negativlikely evaluate their choice positively and choose to maintain
ity point to the ACC as the source for negative reward prediction
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errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2005), which may
be responsible for switching behavior. Kennerley et al. (2006)
found that ACC lesion in the nonhuman primate impaired the
animal’s ability to sustain rewarded responses and suggested that
the ACC was critical in guiding choice behavior based on the
consequences of previous actions.
In conclusion, the current study revealed a functional distinction in frontal and striatal areas for processing of positive and
negative reward information at various phases. A better understanding of common and distinct involvement of these regions in
reward processing will not only help model complex rewardrelated decision making but also aid in developing treatments
targeted toward disruption of different components of reward
circuitry.
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